Showing posts with label GMFUS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GMFUS. Show all posts
Friday, 10 June 2016
Friday, 20 May 2016
Holding the West Together Over Russia (Stephen Szabo, GMFUS)
The West has been tested by Russia in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and has passed the test to date
http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/05/17/holding-west-together-over-russia
http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/05/17/holding-west-together-over-russia
Sunday, 15 May 2016
Russia, China, and the West After Crimea (Angela Stent, GMFUS)
On May 13, 2016, the Transatlantic Academy published a paper by Senior Fellow Angela Stent entitled "Russia, China, and the West After Crimea," the eighth in its 2015-16 Paper Series.
Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Vladimir Putin has enthusiastically promoted ties with China as an alternative to Russia’s adversarial relationship with the United States and Europe. Presidents Putin and Xi have lavishly praised each other and criticized U.S. “unilateralism.” They have stepped up their military cooperation — conducting joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean last year — and signed major energy deals, such as the $400 billion Power of Siberia Gas pipeline project. In 2015, they attended each other’s military parades commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, when no Western leader attended either. The rhetoric and optics stress close ties between two leaders who share a conviction that their countries were unfairly treated in the past. They are also uncomfortable with the current international political and financial order, which, they believe, denies them equal treatment in setting the agenda and determining the institutional rules.
Despite the intensification of Sino-Russian ties since the annexation of Crimea, however, this remains a pragmatic and instrumental partnership, not a prelude to a closer alliance. For Moscow, the partnership is designed to reinforce Russia’s role as an independent center of global power, one of Putin’s key foreign policy goals. It is also intended to confer success by association from a rising China to a Russia experiencing serious economic problems. China’s support for Russia has served to legitimize Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Syria. Russia is a useful partner for China because it supplies China with hydrocarbons and advanced military hardware, supports China on all major foreign policy issues, and pursues a policy of noninterference in China’s domestic affairs. While Chinese experts may privately express criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, publicly officials have adopted a policy of neutrality. In return, Russia has not commented publically on China’s military activities in the South China Sea, although these actions have irked Russia’s other Asian partners such as Vietnam.
China protects Russia from the full impact of Western sanctions and gives it continuing international legitimacy at a time when the West has sought to isolate it. Beijing has remained neutral as Russia has destabilized Ukraine used military force to keep the Assad regime in power in Syria. Nevertheless, China is unlikely to take actions that would contravene Western sanctions against Russia. Its economic interests in both the United States and Europe are significantly greater than are its economic interests in Russia. Ultimately, while the Kremlin seeks to overturn the U.S.-led global order and promote a tripolar world order, Beijing prefers to reform the existing order to suit its economic and geostrategic interests, and it regards the United States as its only true global counterpart
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/russia-china-and-west-after-crimea
Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Vladimir Putin has enthusiastically promoted ties with China as an alternative to Russia’s adversarial relationship with the United States and Europe. Presidents Putin and Xi have lavishly praised each other and criticized U.S. “unilateralism.” They have stepped up their military cooperation — conducting joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean last year — and signed major energy deals, such as the $400 billion Power of Siberia Gas pipeline project. In 2015, they attended each other’s military parades commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, when no Western leader attended either. The rhetoric and optics stress close ties between two leaders who share a conviction that their countries were unfairly treated in the past. They are also uncomfortable with the current international political and financial order, which, they believe, denies them equal treatment in setting the agenda and determining the institutional rules.
Despite the intensification of Sino-Russian ties since the annexation of Crimea, however, this remains a pragmatic and instrumental partnership, not a prelude to a closer alliance. For Moscow, the partnership is designed to reinforce Russia’s role as an independent center of global power, one of Putin’s key foreign policy goals. It is also intended to confer success by association from a rising China to a Russia experiencing serious economic problems. China’s support for Russia has served to legitimize Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Syria. Russia is a useful partner for China because it supplies China with hydrocarbons and advanced military hardware, supports China on all major foreign policy issues, and pursues a policy of noninterference in China’s domestic affairs. While Chinese experts may privately express criticism of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, publicly officials have adopted a policy of neutrality. In return, Russia has not commented publically on China’s military activities in the South China Sea, although these actions have irked Russia’s other Asian partners such as Vietnam.
China protects Russia from the full impact of Western sanctions and gives it continuing international legitimacy at a time when the West has sought to isolate it. Beijing has remained neutral as Russia has destabilized Ukraine used military force to keep the Assad regime in power in Syria. Nevertheless, China is unlikely to take actions that would contravene Western sanctions against Russia. Its economic interests in both the United States and Europe are significantly greater than are its economic interests in Russia. Ultimately, while the Kremlin seeks to overturn the U.S.-led global order and promote a tripolar world order, Beijing prefers to reform the existing order to suit its economic and geostrategic interests, and it regards the United States as its only true global counterpart
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/russia-china-and-west-after-crimea
Friday, 6 May 2016
Toward an Eastern Mediterranean Integrated Gas Infrastructure? (Shaul Zemach, GMFUS)
This paper puts forward the outline of a proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean Integrated Gas Infrastructure. This proposal, while seemingly idealistic, is in fact pragmatic, taking as its point of departure existing pipelines and LNG plants. The proposal is scalable, setting out what could be accomplished now and what could be developed in the medium to long term if conditions permit. The author identifies an important role for the United States and the European Union in bringing the project to fruition. At a time of increased tension and violence in Syria and other countries in the broader Middle East, it may appear unrealistic to propose an initiative designed to promote regional cooperation on energy infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean. Energy cooperation requires a modicum of trust and cannot replace political moves to resolve international conflict. Yet even the most tenacious conflicts eventually end or, at least, subside. It is timely to consider how regional cooperation could help to optimize the potential benefits of offshore gas discoveries for the peoples in countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. This paper considers what regional cooperation on infrastructure and related matters might look like, assuming, however improbable at present, that long-standing political conflicts are overcome or, at least, stabilized. This paper is also an invitation to authorities in neighboring states, as well as the EU and the United States, to reflect on an innovative collaborative approach.
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/toward-eastern-mediterranean-integrated-gas-infrastructure
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/toward-eastern-mediterranean-integrated-gas-infrastructure
Making the Best of the Bad EU-Turkey Deal (Rosa Balfour, GMFUS)
The EU-Turkey deal is a bitter pill. Agreed to on March 18 but far from fully implemented, the agreement is ambiguous from the legal point of view, undermining the rights of asylum seekers and the duty to offer international protection; and hard to execute, as it gives Greece herculean burdens to screen asylum requests and relies on Turkey to respect international law. Even if it were implemented, it would not solve the problem of the refugee influx. The closure of the Eastern Mediterranean route has re-opened other, more dangerous routes, which resulted in at least 500 victims two weeks ago – nearly half the death toll of 2016.
http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/05/03/making-best-bad-eu-turkey-deal
http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/05/03/making-best-bad-eu-turkey-deal
Wednesday, 27 January 2016
Friday, 15 January 2016
Thursday, 17 December 2015
Friday, 30 October 2015
Thursday, 15 October 2015
Friday, 9 October 2015
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